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Abstract
This paper investigates market-wide risk aversion in an international setting. Particularly,
this empirical study evaluates risk aversion spillover dynamics as an uncertainty transmission
mechanism for the period 2000-2015 to reveal if there has been a signiﬁcant change in these
dynamics when markets are going through turbulent periods. As a plausible proxy for risk
aversion, variance risk premium (VRP) is computed through the diﬀerence between expected
variances under risk-neutral and physical measures for seven markets studied: United States,
United Kingdom, Germany, France, Netherlands, Switzerland and Japan. Eﬀects of a shock
to U.S. VRP on the other markets' VRPs are evaluated through Generalized Forecast Error
Variance Decomposition. Results show that risk aversion spillovers from U.S. to other markets
are stronger while the U.S. is going through turbulent periods conﬁrming the intuition that
investors are more focused on incidents in the turbulent market. Markets become more con-
nected in terms of sentiments when a country is unexpectedly hit by a major crisis, limiting
diversiﬁcation opportunities.
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1 Introduction
Following the 2007 subprime crisis, empirical and theoretical studies on contagion have regained
attention. Early studies have conceived the contagion phenomenon in a very broad sense, as
being any cross-country transmission of shocks. Fundamentals-based explanations of contagion
dominated this generation of studies. Some papers argued that shocks are transmitted through
trade links that connect diﬀerent countries (Glick and Rose, 1999), while several others emphasize
the role of ﬁnancial linkages in propagation of crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000). Another
strand of literature adopted a restrictive deﬁnition, conﬁning the contagion phenomenon to exces-
sive cross-country correlations, beyond what can be explained through trade and credit channels.
Behavioral arguments are employed to explain these excessive correlations. The role of a risk pre-
mium channel is stressed within these behavioral arguments. When one market is hit by an adverse
shock, investors' risk aversion increases. This shift in investor sentiment leads to an upward ad-
justment of risk premia on all risky assets (Kumar and Persaud, 2002). Longstaﬀ (2010) ﬁnds that
negative shocks to subprime asset-backed collateralized debt obligations market are propagated
to other markets primarily through time-varying risk premia. Baker et al. (2012) suggest that
investor sentiment itself is contagious and that international capital ﬂows constitute an important
mechanism by which sentiment spreads across markets. An interesting paper by Mondria and
Quintana-Domeque (2013) suggest that sudden shifts in market conﬁdence cause contagion. They
empirically ﬁnd that when a region is hit by a ﬁnancial crisis, investors optimally relocate their
attention to this region and that this attention relocation leads to volatility transmission from the
turbulent region to the others. The less anticipated the crisis is, the more focused the investors
would be on the turbulent region, giving rise to a higher contagion.
Related to the above studies hinging on the risk premium channel to explain volatility spillovers,
this paper investigates market-wide risk aversion in an international setting. As a plausible proxy
for risk aversion, variance risk premium (VRP) is computed through the diﬀerence between ex-
pected variances under risk-neutral and physical measures. The risk-neutral measures are readily
provided by VIX-type implied volatility indexes for seven markets studied: United States, United
Kingdom, Germany, France, Netherlands, Switzerland and Japan. The physical measures are based
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on range-based volatilities that are computed using daily stock index data. The risk-neutral mea-
sure provides us with the implied volatility that captures investors' perception on the uncertainty
for the upcoming month whereas the physical measure gives the expected level of actual volatility
for the same period. This time-varying risk aversion is a noteworthy factor behind ﬂuctuations in
the risk premia. It is thus worth to analyze risk premium spillovers as an important aspect related
to the risk premium channel.
This empirical study evaluates risk aversion spillover dynamics for the period 2000-2015. This
period is divided into ﬁve subperiods covering tranquil or turbulent states in the U.S. and Eu-
ropean ﬁnancial markets. For each period, risk aversion spillovers are studied as an uncertainty
transmission mechanism to reveal if there has been a signiﬁcant change in the spillover dynamics
especially around subprime mortgage crisis. Eﬀects of a shock to U.S. VRP on the other markets'
VRPs are evaluated through Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (GFEVD) de-
veloped by Pesaran and Shin (1998). Results show that risk aversion spillovers from U.S. to other
markets are stronger while the U.S. is going through turbulent periods conﬁrming the intuition that
investors are more focused on incidents in the turbulent market. Markets become more connected
in terms of sentiments when a country is unexpectedly hit by a major crisis, limiting diversiﬁcation
opportunities when investors are most in need of the gains stemming from diversiﬁcation.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: The second section introduces the construction
of volatility measures. Range-based volatilities, physical and risk-neutral measures of expected
measures that are used to estimate VRPs as a proxy for market-wide risk aversion levels are
shortly discussed here. Data used for the analysis is given in the third section. The fourth section
presents the empirical methodology discusses the empirical results. The ﬁfth section concludes.
2 Range-Based Volatility and Variance Risk Premia
2.1 Range-Based Volatilities
In the literature several volatility estimators are employed ranging from the classical close-to-
close estimator based on daily returns to realized volatilities derived from intraday prices. While
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realized volatility measures provide more accurate volatility estimates, daily data based volatility
estimators are still being widely used as it may be hard (or impossible in some cases) to obtain
intraday data. Range-based volatility estimators provide an intermediate solution to this dilemma.
We do not need intraday data to estimate range-based volatilities, and range-based volatilities are
far better estimators of volatilities when compared to the close-to-close estimator.
Garman and Klass (1980) proposed a volatility estimator based on the opening, closing, highest
and lowest prices information. As the intraday high-low price range provides additional information
regarding volatility, Garman-Klass estimator constitute a more eﬃcient estimator than the close-
to-close estimator that is based on two arbitrary points in price series. Garman and Klass suggest
the following estimator that may be applied to compute daily volatilities:
σt =
√
0.5
[
log
(
Ht
Lt
)]2
− [2 log 2− 1]
[
log
(
Ct
Ot
)]2
x100 (1)
where Ot is the opening price, Ct is the closing price, Ht is the highest price and Lt is the lowest
price of the tth trading day.
2.2 Variance Risk Premia
Investors do not only require compensation for volatility of returns. It is now well established
that investors demand additional compensation for risk when they perceive that the danger of
big shocks to the state of the economy is high1. VRP is the compensation for variance risk that
stems from the randomness of return variances. It is shown to be procyclical, increasing in market
downturns that are characterized by high volatility and high risk aversion. As such, it is used to
capture investors' attitudes toward uncertainty (Bollerslev et al., 2011; Bakshi and Madan, 2006).
If estimated appropriately, VRP may constitute a good proxy for the risk aversion.
VRP is deﬁned as the diﬀerence in expected variances under risk-neutral and physical measures
over the [t, t+ n] time interval2:
1See, for example, Bollerslev et al., 2009; Drechsler and Yaron, 2011
2See, for example, Demeterﬁ et al., 1999; Britten-Jones and Neuberger, 2000; Jiang and Tian, 2005; Carr and
Wu, 2008
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V RPt,t+n = E
P(V art,t+n | Ft)− EQ(V art,t+n | Ft) (2)
where EP(·) and EQ(·) denote the time t expectation operator under the physical and risk-neutral
measures respectively. These measures are not directly observable. Several methods have been
developed to approximate them.
To make the distribution closer to normality V RPt,t+n may be expressed in its logarithmic
form:
log (V RPt,t+n) = log
(
EP(V art,t+n | Ft)
)− log (EQ(V art,t+n | Ft)) (3)
The risk-neutral expectation of the future variance
(
EQ
)
in the above equation is measured
based on option prices, as a weighted average, or integral, of a continuum of a ﬁxed n-maturity
options:
EQt (V art,t+n) = IV
∗
t,t+n∆ = 2
∫ ∞
0
C(t+ n,K)− C(t,K)
K2
dK (4)
where C(t,K) denotes the price of a European call option maturing at time t with strike price K.
The physical measure
(
EP
)
is approximated through using realized variance measures that are
derived from the underlying security prices. Methods used to compute the physical expectation
vary in practice. While Carr and Wu (2008) use simply the ex-post forward realized variance
to substitute for the expected return variance Drechsler and Yaron (2011) use lagged implied
and realized variances to forecast it. Todorov (2009) estimates the physical measure in a semi-
parametric framework. Bollerslev et al. (2009) use a multifrequency autoregression with multiple
lags and Zhou (2010) uses a simple autoregression with twelve lags to estimate the objective
expectation of the return variance.
In this paper, the expected variance under the physical measure is estimated through a Het-
erogeneous Autoregressive (HAR) model that is proposed by Corsi (2009). The HAR model
is a straightforward unfolding of Heterogeneous Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity
(HARCH) models analysed earlier in Müller et al. (1997). An HAR model can be speciﬁed
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as a multi-component variance model in which the conditional variance is parametrized as a sum
of variance components over diﬀerent horizons. In its simplest form, an HAR model is estimated
through the sum of daily, weekly and monthly variances
σ2t = βDσ
2
t−1 + βWσ
2
t−5:t−1 + βMσ
2
t−22:t−1 (5)
where
σ2t+1−k:t =
1
k
k∑
j=1
σ2t−j
and where the coeﬃcients βD, βW , βM are determined through an OLS estimation.
Given that the logarithmic daily variances are approximately unconditionally normally dis-
tributed, Equation 5 is expressed in its logarithmic form following Andersen et al. (2007):
log
(
σ2t
)
= βD log
(
σ2t−1
)
+ βW log
(
σ2t−5:t−1
)
+ βM log
(
σ2t−22:t−1
)
(6)
where
log(σ2t+1−k:t) =
1
k
k∑
j=1
log(σ2t−j)
3 Data
In this paper VRP series are computed for 15 years, from February 2000 to February 2015, for seven
markets studied: United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Netherlands, Switzerland
and Japan. As mentioned above, estimation of the VRP series that I employ to approximate
risk aversion levels for each market is based on risk-neutral and physical measures of future index
volatilities.
The risk-neutral measures, the options-implied volatilities, are readily provided by Datastream.
Implied volatility series are computed based on index options covering out-of-the-money strike
prices for near and next-term maturities following the widely used VIX methodology of the Chicago
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Board of Options Exchange 3. This model-free implied volatility is proven to be a better approx-
imation to the one month ahead risk-neutral expectation of the integrated volatility than the
Black-Scholes implied volatility. Implied volatility series were provided in annualized measures.
In order to obtain daily estimates, implied volatility measures are divided by
√
365. The daily-
standardized estimates of the expected one-month ahead volatility under the physical measure are
obtained based on the logarithmic HAR model given in Equation 6.
Japanese market is closed before the other markets are opened. Data is adjusted to cope with
this issue: for the estimation, Japanese market data is led by one day.
Summary statistics of the constructed volatility series for each market are provided in Table 1.
For all of the ﬁnancial markets, akin to the empirical literature, risk-neutral measures are higher
than the physical measures of expected volatility during almost all the period. VRP series have
thus negative values. To represent the level of risk aversion, these series are multiplied by −1.
Logarithmic measures of risk aversion levels are fairly close to normality, although some of the
series are slightly right skewed and leptokurtic.
Figure 1 shows risk aversion series used in the estimation. Data covers ﬁve subperiods of alter-
nating volatility and risk aversion levels. The ﬁrst period spans from February 2000 to September
2003 and it is dominated by the negative consequences of the dot-com bubble burst and the 9/11
attacks in the United States. A relatively stable period follows from October 2003 to July 2007.
The most interesting periods start by August 2007 and concern the recent ﬁnancial crisis. During
the second half of 2007, negative eﬀects of the decline in housing prices started to be felt in the
overall U.S. economy, and this led to a panic in the stock and foreign exchange markets by the be-
ginning of 2008. With the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the crisis is remarkably
deepened, and it gained a global character through a drastic decrease in global liquidity by the
ﬁrst half of 2009. Between January 2010 and July 2012, European Sovereign Debt Crisis troubled
especially the Euro-area countries. The last period starts by August 2012 and it is characterized
by relative stability.
3This method is developed by Demeterﬁ et al. (1999).
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4 Empirical Strategy and Results
The empirical analysis is based on GFEVD that is obtained through a Vector Autoregressive VAR)
model formulated as follows:
Xt =
p∑
p=1
ΦpXt−p + t (7)
where Yt, Yt−1,..., Yt−p are (8× 1) vectors containing logarithmic measures of VRPs of the seven
markets studied as estimated through Equation 3, p is the VAR order, Phi1, Phi2,..., Phip are
(8× 8) matrices containing the VAR parameters to be estimated, and t is a vector of innovations.
In the empirical analysis, VAR orders are determined based on Akaike Information Criterion.
Once the covariance stationarity condition is satisﬁed the above VAR model can be rewritten
in an inﬁnite order moving average representation:
Xt =
∞∑
j=0
Ψjt−j (8)
where the (8× 8) moving average coeﬃcient matrices, Ψj obey the recursion Ψj = Φ1Ψj−1 +
Φ2Ψj−2, ...+ ΦpΨj−p with Ψ0 an identity matrix.
These moving average coeﬃcients are used to generate impulse response functions (IRF) and
forecast error variance decompositions (FEVD) to study the impact of a hypothetical shock on
the dynamics of the system. When VAR innovations are contemporaneously correlated Cholesky
factorization is generally employed to obtain orthogonalized innovations. However, in this case,
IRF and FEVD results highly depend on the ordering of the variables. Pesaran and Shin (1998)
proposes a solution to this problem through Generalized VAR framework that allows correlated
shocks. In this framework Generalized IRF is deﬁned as follows:
GIRFi(h) =
√
σiiΨhΣei (9)
where Σ is the variance-covariance matrix of residuals, and ei is the selection vector with one at a
position i and zeros otherwise. The GIRF thus deﬁned allows us to assess the eﬀect of one standard
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error shock to the ith equation at time t on expected values of vector X at horizon t + h. The
corresponding GFEVD captures the share of the h-step ahead forecast error variance of variable j
which is due to the innovations in variable i:
GFEVDj,i(h) =
σ−1jj
∑h
h=0
(
e
′
jΨhΣei
)2∑h
h=0 e
′
jΨhΣΨ
′
hej
(10)
GFEVDs are estimated for each of the ﬁve subperiods described in the data section. All the
GIRFs are fully stabilized at 30 lags. Thus, GFEVDs are estimated for 30 days horizon. As the
shocks are not orthogonalized, forecast error variance decompositions for each response variable
do not necessarily sum to one. In order to make the results comparable, the sums of contributions
of impulse variables to the variance of forecast error of each response variable are normalized to
one.
Main empirical results are reported in Table 2, Table 3, Figure 2, and Figure 3. Table 2 and
Figure 2 contain the percentage contributions of risk aversion of the U.S. market (as represented
by the -log of VRP of the S&P 500) to the variances of forecast error of each of the other ﬁnancial
markets. Periods one to ﬁve heading the columns of the table stand for the subperiods of the
data sample. The importance of risk aversion spillovers from U.S. to other markets is lower in
the second period when compared to the ﬁrst period which marked by a ﬁnancial turbulence due
to the dot-com bubble burst. All the markets seem to be focused on the U.S. market with the
subprime crisis: except for Japan, the weights of the risk aversion spillover eﬀects from U.S. are
more than doubled (even tripled) in the third period, compared to the second period. These high
levels of weights are sustained in the following periods.
Another interesting regularity is presented in Table 3 and Figure 3. Shares of forecast error
variances due to shocks to each market itself are provided here. For all of the markets, there is a
substantial decrease in the importance of the own shocks in GFEVDs in the third period which is
marked by the outbreak of the subprime crisis in U.S. after a long period of tranquility. With the
crisis, all the markets become more prone to risk aversion spillovers from other markets, possibly
because investors allocate more attention and become more sensitive to what is going on in all
over the world. That is to say, markets become more connected in terms of sentiments when a
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country is unexpectedly hit by a major crisis. By the end of the subprime crisis, investors in
Japan are tranquilized fast: pre-crisis levels are attained by the fourth period in Japan. Other
markets suﬀer from the negative eﬀects of the European sovereign debt crisis in the fourth period.
Averted investors in these markets continue to allocate more attention to the rest of the world. The
negative eﬀects of the debt crisis continue to hold more or less even in the ﬁfth period for Euro-
zone countries while pre-subprime crisis levels are attained in the U.K. and Switzerland. Japan
is stabilized faster than the U.K. and Switzerland, possibly because the U.K and Switzerland are
more closely connected to Euro-zone countries.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, risk aversion spillover dynamics is studied for seven ﬁnancial markets from 2000
to 2015 through a Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition analysis. Data sample is
divided into ﬁve subperiods covering tranquil or turbulent states in the U.S. market. It is found that
risk aversion spillovers from U.S. to other markets get much stronger starting from the third period
while the U.S. is going through turbulent periods conﬁrming the intuition that investors shift their
attention on incidents in the turbulent market. Results also show that, with the outbreak of the
subprime crisis in U.S., all the markets become more prone to risk aversion spillovers from the other
markets. Markets become more connected in terms of sentiments when a country is unexpectedly
hit by a major crisis, limiting diversiﬁcation opportunities when investors are most in need of
the gains stemming from diversiﬁcation. Further interesting results are obtained concerning the
European sovereign debt crisis. The debt crisis has only regional eﬀects on investors with Japan
remained unaﬀected. The negative eﬀects of debt crisis on investors' attention allocation last
longer for Euro-zone countries than for the U.K. and Switzerland. This shows that investors' focus
is determined by a complex amalgam of fundamental and sentimental factors.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Market Series Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev. Skewness Exc. Kurt.
log(EP) -0.3680 -0.4286 -1.2856 1.1631 0.4042 0.7021 0.3505
U.S. log(EQ) 0.0159 -0.0129 -0.6584 1.4428 0.3704 0.6112 0.2376
-log(VRP) 0.3839 0.3766 -0.1791 1.0137 0.1565 0.2528 0.3744
log(EP) -0.2976 -0.3402 -1.1676 1.0549 0.3979 0.5113 -0.1451
U.K. log(EQ) -0.0075 -0.0357 -0.7418 1.3747 0.3784 0.5854 0.0283
-log(VRP) 0.2901 0.2888 -0.1411 0.7128 0.1275 -0.0110 0.0308
log(EP) -0.0824 -0.1134 -0.9537 1.1745 0.4095 0.4762 -0.2952
Germany log(EQ) 0.1794 0.1216 -0.4946 1.4717 0.3573 0.7574 0.1864
-log(VRP) 0.2619 0.2619 -0.1988 0.7657 0.1408 0.0686 0.1154
log(EP) -0.1472 -0.1653 -0.9626 1.0540 0.3796 0.3643 -0.3734
France log(EQ) 0.1436 0.1182 -0.7262 1.4074 0.3480 0.5546 0.1234
-log(VRP) 0.2908 0.2908 -0.1935 0.7628 0.1347 -0.0329 0.1677
log(EP) -0.2343 -0.2858 -1.1188 1.0214 0.4189 0.5788 -0.1767
Netherlands log(EQ) 0.1216 0.0589 -1.1973 1.4472 0.3964 0.7180 0.0491
-log(VRP) 0.3560 0.3533 -0.6894 0.9423 0.1426 -0.0386 0.7912
log(EP) -0.3700 -0.4713 -1.1576 0.9693 0.3929 0.8324 0.2339
Switzerland log(EQ) -0.0177 -0.1026 -0.8525 1.5277 0.3998 0.9324 0.6924
-log(VRP) 0.3523 0.3442 -0.1527 1.0819 0.1625 0.3442 0.5870
log(EP) -0.2666 -0.2762 -1.1246 0.9477 0.3082 0.2474 0.4608
Japan log(EQ) 0.2644 0.2554 0.5059 1.5658 0.2945 0.8320 1.7596
-log(VRP) 0.5311 0.5240 -0.3227 1.3186 0.1808 0.1968 0.2401
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Table 2: Risk aversion spillovers from U.S. to other markets
Generalized Forecast Error Variance Distributions are given for responding countries for each of
the ﬁve periods.
Period 1: Dot-com bubble burst and 9/11 attacks.
Period 2: Relatively stable period.
Period 3: Subprime crisis and Lehman Brothers bankruptcy.
Period 4: European sovereign debt crisis.
Period 5: Relatively stable period.
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5
U.K. (FTSE) 0.1067 0.0430 0.1287 0.1204 0.1617
Germany (DAX) 0.0698 0.0515 0.1472 0.1285 0.1120
France (CAC) 0.0500 0.0394 0.1356 0.0863 0.1029
Netherlands (AEX) 0.0472 0.0386 0.1424 0.0952 0.0931
Switzerland (SMI) 0.0198 0.0158 0.0624 0.0748 0.0818
Japan (NIKKEI) 0.0959 0.0276 0.0351 0.0356 0.0554
Table 3: Generalized Forecast Error Variance Distributions due to own shocks
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5
U.K. (FTSE) 0.3919 0.4163 0.2695 0.3139 0.4171
Germany (DAX) 0.4391 0.3902 0.3118 0.2916 0.3578
France (CAC) 0.4659 0.3407 0.2752 0.3092 0.2846
Netherlands (AEX) 0.4908 0.4617 0.3378 0.2908 0.3498
Switzerland (SMI) 0.6786 0.6190 0.5002 0.4901 0.6273
Japan (NIKKEI) 0.7916 0.9162 0.7077 0.8903 0.9029
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